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Introduction 
Poverty alleviation is about re-distribution, about sacrifices by the rich and about cross- 
subsidy; how can the poor be a profitable market, and if they ever are, how can their purchases 
be profitable for them as well as for whoever is selling to them ? In most fields, such as health, 
education and basic foodstuffs, we have to accept that the late Tom Lehrer’s dream of ‘doing 
well while doing good’ is just not possible, and that is why we have foreign aid, voluntary 
organisations, taxation and the whole apparatus of non-commercial transfers of resources. 
Those of us who live by this ‘trade’ must recognise that our work can never in itself solve the 
problems of the poor; what we can and must do is to search whenever possible for methods of 
delivering services which the poor can afford and will enable them to become less poor, and 
can at the same time ultimately be profitable businesses. Only then will it be possible for the 
services to be made available on the massive scale that is necessary for them to reach all the 
people who need them. Then the market will be able to take over and we shall achieve the 
ultimate goal of any assistance agent, which is surely to be redundant because of his own 
success. 
Lending money to poor people to enable them to increase their incomes through micro- 
enterprise, which has become known as ‘micro-credit’, may be one activity where this goal has 
been demonstrated to be possible, where everyone can benefit, where nobody is the loser, and 
where enlightened self-interest can coincide with the relief of poverty. 
If this was completely true and self-evident, there would be no need to discuss it in a paper of 
this sort, because the market would have done its job, as it has for soft drinks and so many 
other items which are widely and profitably marketed even in the poorest places. Perhaps, 
however, we are confronted with quite new approaches to financial intermediation. These 
approaches are based firmly on traditional practices, but they appear radical and unprofitable 
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to the formal institutions which must adopt them if financial services are to become widely 
available to everyone. 
I propose in this paper briefly to describe some examples of profitable or at least cost-covering 
micro-credit, which exemplify a variety of ways of achieving this desirable but so often 
unattainable goal of benefiting everyone. These cases are only a small sample of the many quite 
different methods which are being tried, in different countries. It may however be possible to 
identify some common features in the successful provision of reasonably priced fmancial 
services to poor people, to suggest some of the reasons why these financial methods have not 
been more widely adopted by existing banks, and to recommend ways in which their reluctance 
may be overcome. 
One approach uses a rather rigid form of group facilitation, another adopts a system akin to 
venture capital, where the lender shares in unexpectedly good returns but also shares the losses 
when borrowers’ businesses fare worse than was hoped, and a third uses modern cash handling 
technology and a ‘mass-production’ approach to lending. The fourth method, which is still in its 
infancy, involves lending to pre-existing community savings and credit groups, who on-lend 
the money to their members. They have been deliberately chosen in order to demonstrate the 
wide variety of ways in which the same goal is being achieved. They all, however, charge what 
appear to be very high rates of interest, and they reduce transaction costs and increase 
repayment rates in innovative ways so that they can be genuinely self-sustaining. 
The Problem and the Opportunity 
There are in the poorer parts of the world, and in richer ones too, large numbers of men, and 
many more women, who are presently working very hard indeed for tiny rewards, or are not 
working at all because the returns available barely cover the cost of renewing the energy they 
might expend. These people can enormously improve their lot if they have access to very small 
amounts of capital, which is presently not available to them from formal institutions. 
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Such people are denied access to capital for what appear to be very good reasons; the 
transaction costs of dealing with a loan, or of accepting savings, are similar, regardless of the 
amount of money lent or saved, and poor people, by definition, do not have collateral in case 
of non-repayment. It is therefore unprofitable to lend them money, and impossible to recover it 
if they will or cannot repay. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that commercial banks, 
everywhere, have failed to satisfy the financial service needs of the poor. 
The returns that can be earned on these tiny sums would themselves be the envy of the world’s 
financiers. This is not because the sums of money are large, but because small amounts of 
capital can enable poor people to earn something closer to a decent return for their labour. The 
capital is tiny, and the returns are also tiny in absolute terms. but they are often astronomic 
when expressed as a percentage of the capital. 
Sadly, the opportunity cost of these people’s labour is low or even non-existent, so that the 
whole of the increased earnings can be expressed as a return on the sum invested. It is very 
rare indeed to find a real micro-enterprise where the annual return on the capital invested is 
less than one hundred per cent, in real rather than nominal terms, and figures of several 
thousand are not uncommon. It is important to stress again that the sums involved are so small 
that the returns are still miserable in absolute terms, but relatively they are enormous. In this 
lies the opportunity. 
The following table gives a few real-life examples from various countries; readers will be able 
to add similar cases from their own experience. 
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Business Existing Additional NW 
earnings 
per month 
capital 
needed 
earnings 
Egg Vendor $50 $20 
to avoid 
money lender 
$75 
Barber $100 $25 for 
new chair 
$110 
Tailor $60 S50 for cloth 
fix ready-made 
$80 
Rickshaw Driver $30 $200 to buy 
ow rickshnw 
$36 
Puffed Rice Maker $10 $40 IO buy oww $20 
ri(w materiel 
Addition 
to earnings 
Monthly 
return 
percent 
S25 50% 
$10 10% 
$20 33% 
$6 20% 
$10 100% 
Even higher incremental rates of return can be earned by people who are presently not earning 
at all, and who can start a micro-enterprise if they have access to capital. It is self-evident that 
the returns, in percentage terms, are in inverse proportion to the amounts involved. It is all too 
well-known that the poor pay more than the rich for most services, such as water, staple foods 
and even education and health care. In the case of capital, however, they also earn more, 
proportionately, on the meagre amounts they need for petty income-generating activities; this 
suggests that they can pay more for their capital, and indeed they do. Poor people can 
obviously not afford to pay more than the rich for the necessities of life, even though they 
often have to, but the above figures show that they may be able to afford to pay a high price 
for capital. It appears paradoxical, but credit may be one thing for which the poor may be able 
to pay more than the rich. 
Money lenders are of course the main suppliers of money to the poor. They do it as straight 
lenders or as traders who bind outworkers to them by supplying raw materials on credit or by 
advancing money against forthcoming crops. The rates of interest they charge are notoriously 
high, but it is nevertheless unusual to find moneylenders living in palaces; the risks are large, 
the scale of the activity is small, and they have to provide a close, personal and therefore costly 
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service both to satisfy their customers’ needs and to minimise their own losses. In some 
countries moneylenders also have to avoid or buy off the law, since usury is illegal, and this 
adds a further premium of illegality to the price of the capital they provide. 
The high returns on capital earned by the poor mean that they can afford to pay the very high 
rates of interest demanded by moneylenders, even though these rates often reduce their own 
earnings to a pitiably low level. If the only way genuinely to satisfy the capital needs of the 
poor is through the kind of service provided by moneylenders, then viable lending to the poor 
must be extortionate, and their high returns must be shared with their informal bankers. Is 
there any way in which the poor can have access to credit at more reasonable rates, which are 
still sufficiently remunerative to the lender to allow the business to be viable and thus to 
expand beyond the modest scale permitted by subsidy or charity ? 
Some Examples of Institutional Micro-credit 
There are of course many local groups and voluntary organisations which have established 
micro-credit programmes which are cover some part of their operating costs from interest 
earnings, but these generally operate on a local scale. They may reach a few hundred or a few 
thousand people, and some succeed in covering most of their costs, but the overall impact is 
very small. Only when this market is addressed by the existing commercial banks, or by new 
lending institutions established for the purpose, will the benefits become available to more than 
a tiny fraction of the vast numbers of people who need them. 
There are in fact some specialised institutions which are taking advantage of this benign 
paradox of the poor being able to pay more, and which have enabled very large numbers of 
poor people to extricate themselves from the lowest levels of poverty. The best known 
example is probably the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which is lending small sums of around 
- 
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sixty dollars, and recovering about 98% of them, to over one and a half million people, of 
whom 96% are women. 
In Indonesia, over three million relatively poor rural people are now able to access from 
commercial banks the small sums of capital they need at an affordable cost. In Sudan, surely 
one of the world’s most troubled economies, the banks are using with the traditional Islamic 
principles of risk and profit sharing finance by working in partnership with poor people, again 
mainly women, to the mutual benefit of both parties. 
Opinions differ as to the meaning of the word self-sustaining. A service must however cover 
its operating costs and the cost of the money it lends, or at least that part of this money that is 
borrowed from the client group or from unsubsidised institutional sources, before it can be 
made widely available beyond the scope of aid, charity or subsidy. In order to allow readers to 
judge for themselves as to the viability of some of these institutional initiatives, we shall 
present summarised financial data for typical branch operations of three very different 
organisations which claim to have attained self-sustainability. These cases should also serve to 
give some idea of the very different methods of operation which can be employed to achieve 
the same objective, namely self-sustaining financial services for the poor. 
The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) 
The Grameen Bank is certainly the best known micro-credit institution in Bangladesh, and 
perhaps in the world, and its methodology has been widely imitated, not only in Bangladesh 
and other poor countries in Asia and Africa, but also in the somewhat less likely circumstances 
of Chicago, New Hampshire and elsewhere in the United States. Grameen Bank is only one of 
many institutions providing financial services to the poor in Bangladesh, however. BRAC is 
serving over four hundred thousand people, of whom the majority are women, and it differs 
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from Grameen in that it also offers a range of other services, particularly primary education 
and health care, as well as savings and credit. 
BIWC’s management have taken the decision to transfer its banking operations to the newly 
established BRAC Bank, branch by branch, as they reach self-sustainability. Ultimately, it is 
hoped, this bank will not only cover its own costs but will earn a profit which can help to pay 
for the other services which can never completely pay for themselves, such as village primary 
schools or health clinics. 
The BRAC branch in Gazaria, an island community in the delta area some fifty kilometres from 
Dhaka, is typical of the longer-established branches which are becoming eligible for transfer to 
the new bank. The branch has a staff of 23 people of whom 15, including the manager, are 
mainly engaged in the savings and credit operation, which serves 6450 clients. The clients are 
organised into 129 groups with an average of some 50 people in each; 92 of these groups are 
for women, and the other 37 for men. The other branch staff supervise the 77 primary schools 
and other BRAC activities in Gazaria. 
In order to be eligible for credit, the group members have to complete a 30 days 
conscientisation training course, and they have each to save a minimum of five cents a week 
for six months, in order to demonstrate their commitment and loyalty to the group. Since only 
the poorest people are allowed to join, whose families have less than half an acre of land and 
thus depend on wretchedly paid day labour for most of their income, even this weekly savings 
requirement involves a significant sacrifice. 
Each group holds a meeting once a week at a predetermined time and place, and a BRACT 
staff member attends to collect the savings and any repayments, and to listen to orally 
presented loan proposals. If these are approved by a majority of the group members the BRAC 
worker submits them to the Branch manager; if he approves, the loan is disbursed to the 
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borrower after fifteen days at most. Five per cent is deducted from the loan at the time of 
disbursement for credit to the borrower’s savings account, and a further four per cent is 
deducted for a group emergency trust fund, 
The groups are jointly and severally responsible for repayment, and overdue amounts can be 
charged to these funds, but this rarely occurs, since members virtually always recover overdue 
accounts by one means or another. If their fellow-member is genuinely unable to repay, they 
may decide to pay on her behalf or to deduct the amount from their trust fund. 
The BRAC clients use their loans to finance a wide range of activities, such as petty trading, 
rice processing, short-term farming ventures, often on land which is temporarily leased for the 
purpose, and goat and cattle purchase. The sums are small, as are the returns, but in 
percentage terms they are more than enough to enable the clients to pay the high rates of 
interest which are necessary to cover the very labour-intensive banking operation, and the 
surplus is enough to make a significant difference to the borrowers’ standard of living, even 
during the period of repayment. 
In November 1992 the financial position of the BRAC Gazaria branch was approximately as 
follows: the figures are expressed in US dollars at the rate of 60 Bangladeshi taka to $1.00; the 
totals appear small, but many rural people in the position of BRAC clients earn as little as 
twenty cents a day. 
Assets Liabilities 
Cash at bank $1100 $ 63300 
Loans to Members $ 135000 
Members’ Savings 
$ 16700 
Bicycles and eqpt. $1700 
Group Trust Funds 
Funds from Head 
Land and Building $ 18900 office $ 76700 
Total $ 156700 $156700 
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The BRAC Gazaria branch maintains a current account at a nearby public sector commercial 
bank, from which it can avail of overdraft facilities when necessary. The members pay interest 
on their loans from BRAC at an annual rate of 20%, on a declining balance basis; the total of 
9% deducted at disbursement for their savings and trust funds, plus an additional 1% life 
insurance premium, mean that the real cost of the funds to the borrowers is well over thirty per 
cent. No charge is made by the BRAC head office for the funds which are needed by branches 
over and above their members’ savings and trust fimds, but a 6% annual cost is shortly to be 
introduced in order to cover head office banking administration charges. 
The current annual operations of the Gazaria branch can be summarised approximately as 
follows: 
Interest Income $25200 
Interest on members savings 
and trust funds @ 9% $ 6000 
Wages and Salaries $13100 
Travel and allowances $ 1500 
Maintenance & Depreciation $ 2000 
Total $22600 
Profit $2600 
This profit will cover rather more than half of the six per cent charge for Head Offrce funds; 
greater reliance on members’ own funds would of course increase the deficit. BRAC 
management are however confident that the Gazaria branch, as well as most of the other 
longer established branches, will soon achieve genuine profitability, in spite, or perhaps 
because, of their deliberate concentration on the poorest clients. The BR4C capital fund is 
being eroded by inflation to the extent of approximately 10% annually, but increases in 
members’ deposits are maintaining and indeed increasing the real value of total funds available 
at a considerably faster rate than this. 
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The Sudan Islamic Bank 
The Koran explicitly prohibits lending money at interest; profitable trading, however, is 
recognised as being perfectly legitimate, and Mohammed himself is said to have started his 
career as a trader, financed by a wealthy widow who later became his wife. Their dealings, 
however, were on a profit sharing rather than a fixed interest basis. 
We are today familiar with venture capital as a means of financing new and growing 
businesses, but this form of investment has only recently been introduced in the less developed 
countries, and then only for larger formal ventures. The ‘Musharaka’ or partnership variant of 
Islamic finance is being used by the Sudan Islamic Bank to provide capital for very small 
ventures indeed. It is in addition protecting the bank from the worst of the effects of inflation, 
which is currently running at something between one and two hundred per cent per year in the 
Sudan. 
The Bank has been engaged in partnership financing of very small-scale enterprises for some 
years. Until recently they have concentrated on rural activities, such as potato cultivation and 
poultry production; in some cases the bank has been an active partner, assisting with the 
supply of inputs and services, and the marketing of the crops. This experience has been 
generally satisfactory, and because the bank’s share of the profits is calculated as a proportion 
of the final profits, rather than being related to the original investment, the returns have been 
automatically corrected for inflation. 
More recently, however, the Bank established a special branch in one of the poorer areas of 
Omdurman, the original capital of Sudan which is in fact much larger than Khartoum, the 
adjacent colonial capital on the other side of the River Nile. The population of the city has 
been enormously increased in recent years by the influx of refugees from Sudan’s troubled 
neighbours, and by Sudanese people who have had to leave rural areas because of long periods 
11 
- 
-_ 
- 
- 
of drought. This first specialist branch has been opened because the Bank wishes to serve these 
people, in order to reach a new and profitable market and to fulfil its social obligations. They 
have already decided to open six similar branches in other parts of the capital and elsewhere, 
because of the immediate success of the initial pilot. 
Each partnership is based on an agreed estimate of the likely profits. Some partnerships, 
particularly in agricultural or trading businesses, are based on one transaction. The bank and 
the client agree on a reasonable reward for the client’s labour and management, and the 
balance is divided in the same proportion as the two partners’ investments. If the venture fares 
better than expected, or if prices have risen because of inflation, both share the higher surplus, 
but if the venture does not go as well as it was hoped, they get less. If it fails altogether, both 
partners lose their investment and the client loses his labour as well, but he is not additionally 
burdened by a loan obligation as he would be under ‘Western’ banking practice. 
Partnerships in on-going businesses are similar, except that the bank, and the client, do not 
automatically recover their investment; the bank remains a partner, and continues to receive its 
agreed share of the surplus, after allowing for the labour and management of the client. The 
client is free to buy out the bank’s share, at its original cost, after an agreed period which is 
long enough to allow the bank to earn a reasonable return on the transaction. 
The branch has been in operation for just one year, and its current financial position can be 
summarised as follows: (the figures are expressed in US dollars converted at the rate 
prevailing in January 1993; the total sums appear very small, but is should be remembered that 
many people in Sudan earn less than one dollar a day) 
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Assets Liabilities 
Partnership 
investments 
Other investments 
!§ 54000 
56000 
Furniture and 
banking eqpt. 
Stocks of 
machinery 
Cash 
16000 
65000 
1000 
$192000 $192000 
Customer Deposits $ 176000 
Bank’s original 
investment 16000 
The ‘other investments’ are effectively loans, made on the basis of one of the other Islamic 
financing systems, whereby the bank buys an asset and then resells it to the client at a disclosed 
rate of profit. The sale price is paid back to the bank according to an agreed schedule, so that 
this in effect differs very little from conventional banking, Because of the high and 
unpredictable level of inflation, the Bank is now focusing on risk sharing partnerships, and few 
further purchase and re-sale investments are being made. 
The Bank intends this branch to be self-sustaining not only in terms of earnings but also in 
terms of matching its deposits with investments, or credits; the branch has therefore invested 
the surplus deposits in sewing machines and other similar items of capital equipment which its 
clients use. These will be used for future investments, and the bank is protecting itself and its 
clients from inflation by holding its assets in readily marketable equipment rather than in cash 
or other financial instruments. 
The operations of the branch over its first year can be summarised as follows: 
Income from Investments 
Wages and Salaries 
Rent 
Depreciation 
Total 
Total Profit of branch 
80% payable to depositors 
20% retained by Bank 
$32000 
$9600 
$2400 
$9880 
$21880 
$10120 
$ 8096 
$ 2124 
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The Bank actually re-invests its own share of the branch’s profits in welfare services in the 
community, such as health and education, but this is in the nature of an initial goodwill gesture. 
The profits on the Bank’s original investment in the branch are considered more than adequate, 
particularly in the first year of operation, and it is planned to extend the experiment more 
widely in the near future. 
The Bank is financing about 400 people. Two hundred and sixty of them are investment 
partners, or borrowers as they would be called in a traditional bank, and 80% of them are 
women. The bank has invested an average of around $150 in each venture. Most of these 
partners are also depositors, and there are also two hundred additional depositors who are not 
also using the bank as a source of finance. The partners are involved in a typically wide range 
of petty urban enterprises; about sixty of them are tailors, and others are manufacturing 
processed foodstuffs, shoes, school chalk, cheese and wood and metal furniture. Yet others 
are raising goats or poultry, and many other partners are involved in petty rural trade. 
So far, there have been no defaults. This does not mean, of course, that every business has 
been a successful investment; since payments to the Bank’s by its partners are dependent on 
business profits, there is little incentive for the partners to conceal their problems from the 
bank, and the danger may be that they may pretend that their results are worse than they really 
are. The Bank is directly involved in some of the partnerships, particularly when they depend 
on scarce raw materials or other inputs which can only be accessed on a large scale through 
contacts with senior officials. 
The Bank has a total of ten professional staff, of whom seven are women. This includes three 
field staff, and three other customer service staff in the offrce, who maintain regular contact 
with the partners. They keep control accounts for each partnership at the branch, including 
those businesses whose owners are illiterate and therefore maintain no accounts for 
themselves, and disbursements of working capital are made only as needed; this ensures that 
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the Bank is kept aware of the current operations, and it also limits the Bank’s exposure if 
things start to go seriously wrong. 
This success of this method of financing micro-enterprise may to an extent be related to the 
fact that Sudan is very much a shortage economy, where individual business people need the 
intercession of a large and powerful partner such as the Sudan Islamic Bank, the second 
largest in the country, in order to have access to many facilities. The partnerships also benefit 
from the traditional Sudanese attitude to trust; the relationship between a lender and a 
borrower is clearly less equitable than that between two partners, however different they may 
be in size and financial strength, since partners share both gains and losses. It is all too easy to 
suggest reasons why a system that operates in one society will not operate in another, but 
there are aspects of the Islamic Musharaka system from which everyone can learn. 
The Banco National de Comercio Interior - Mexico 
The Banco National de1 Pequeno Comercio (National Bank for Small Traders), which is now 
known as the Banco National de Comercio Interior (BNCI), or National Bank for Domestic 
Commerce, was set up by the Government of Mexico in 1943. Its task is to provide credit to 
small-scale traders, in order that the many people engaged in these fields could benefit from 
institutional credit. 
In 1988 there were some 640,000 separate trading businesses in Mexico. There were a small 
number of chain stores and other large firms, but the vast majority were very small enterprises, 
providing work for around two people each, including their owners. By 1993 BNCI was 
extending credit to some 85,000 separate establishments, or over ten per cent of the total 
market. 
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BNCI now has 135 branches, 27 of which are in the capital city, while the others are in smaller 
towns elsewhere in the country, and it employs just over 3000 people. In addition to the loans 
for small-scale traders which make up the bulk of its business, BNCI also lends a small 
proportion of its portfolio to larger firms so that they in turn can advance credit to smaller 
firms. 
Banpeco has always endeavoured to reduce its transaction costs. One approach has been to 
appraise loans more on the basis of the market in which clients are tenants rather than on a 
client by client basis. The Bank has over time developed formulae for the amount of capital 
that each type of trader needs. The amount varies according to the size and location of the 
stall, which affects the volume of sales achieved, and the type of goods traded. The credit 
which is offered varies accordingly. 
Banpeco has also reduced appraisal costs by changing from term lending to a system of 
overdrafts; each business can draw up to a maximum amount on demand. Interest is 
calculated daily on the amount outstanding. The rate of interest is 34% per year, which is 
about 4% higher than the rate charged to larger borrowers by other banks. When a client’s 
account is in credit, interest is credited by Banpeco at an annual rate of eight per cent. 
Another more recent approach to reducing transaction costs is by using a credit card system 
and automatic cash dispensers. Clients are given a card which can be used to withdraw cash 
up to their credit limit from the numerous cash dispensing machines which have been installed 
by many banks, particularly in Mexico City. The machines can also receive cash, so that clients 
can pay into their accounts through them as well, and although Banpeco pays a fee of 3% of 
each transaction to the bank which owns the machine this is less expensive than the cost per 
transaction over the counter at a branch. 
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Banpeco pays interest of between 12% and 15% on deposit accounts, depending on the term, 
and 8% on passbook savings accounts. Clients used to be required to accumulate savings to a 
level of 10% of their proposed credit line as a condition of borrowing, and to retain this 
amount, but some traders complained that this was unfair in that they had better uses for their 
money. Banpeco therefore dropped this requirement, and clients are no longer compelled to 
save before being allowed to borrow, nor are they required to have savings accounts, 
In its early years the Bank based its branches in stalls in the public markets themselves, 
because this was inexpensive and very convenient for their clients. This practice has since been 
discontinued, because the stall spaces were very small, security was difficult, and an increasing 
number of clients were not operating within the market, but were occupying shops outside. 
They were reluctant to do their banking in the market but the market stall tenants did not mind 
crossing the street to a bank branch outside. 
The Merced Branch of BNCI is situated across the street from the central vegetable market; 
this is the largest market in Mexico city, and has over 4000 stall holders selling vegetables 
alone. The main business of the branch is with these stall holders; they own the right of 
occupancy of their stalls, subject to regular payment of their very modest rents, and BNCI has 
an agreement that if a customer defaults on a loan the bank has the right to seize and dispose 
of the stall in order to recover the amount due. The Merced branch has only once exercised 
this right in the last few years; their field staff visit clients who are in arrears as soon as the 
position becomes evident, and they usually pay after some discussion and simple advice. Those 
who do not wish to continue their businesses can sell their stalls, and the proceeds are always 
sufficient to pay back any outstanding instalments to BNCI. 
The procedure for extending credit is more or less the same at any branch; the bank’s staff do a 
detailed study of the market, assessing a sample of traders in each category of goods in order 
to assess the capital requirements. Individual traders then apply to the branch; there are 20 
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staff working there and one of the three field workers briefly visits the client at his or her stall 
in order to check that it falls more or less into the previously calculated norms, and if all is well 
the account is opened with a credit limit up to the prescribed amount. The limit can be 
increased either because of inflation or when the trader can show that his business has 
- increased so that he needs a larger facility. 
The Merced branch was at the end of February 1993 extending credit to 2325 clients, of which 
ten were classified as non-performing accounts because their repayments were three months or 
more in arrears. About half the clients are women, and many of the businesses are run by 
husband and wife teams. The average loan is about $1300, but the 2000 market stall holders 
are borrowing an average of little over $300 each; the higher average is caused by a few larger 
accounts held by wholesale traders operating outside the market. 
The Merced branch is one of four in the same area of the city. The area office is located in the 
same building as the branch, but the branch manager has a reasonable degree of lending 
discretion up to a certain limit; an approximate balance sheet for 3 1 12 92 and profit and loss 
account for the month of December are as follows: 
Assets 
Cash $ 17,000 
Current Loans 
Overdue Loans 
Equipment 
Deposit to HQ 
Total 
3,026,OOO 
124,000 
5,000 
1,348,OOO 
$4,520,000 
Liabilities 
Customer Savings 
and Deposits $4,520,000 
Total $4,520,000 
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Profit and Loss Account for December 1 to 31 1992 
Interest on Current Loans 
Interest Paid on H/O deposit 
Other interest 
Commissions 
Other Income 
Total Income 
Interest paid on Deposits 
Net Income 
$ 88,000 
20,000 
15,000 
10,000 
18,000 
$151,000 
$ 58,000 
$93,000 
Operating Costs 23,000 
Administrative costs 41,000 
Depreciation 5,000 
Total Costs $ 69,000 
Net Profit $24,000 
Lending to Groups 
Some commercial banks however, notably in India, have identified an approach whereby they 
can reach out to this market, and can at the same time pass on part of the transaction costs to 
existing intermediaries. They are taking deposits, and lending money, through new or 
preferably existing community groups, which act as genuine retailers of the financial services. 
Unlike the groups used by the BRAC or Grameen Bank systems in Bangladesh, these groups 
actually borrow money from the banks to supplement their own savings, and then on-lend it to 
their members, usually on terms and for purposes which they themselves determine, without 
reference to the bank which provided a part of the funds. 
In some cases the groups are assisted or even initiated by NGOs, and Myrada in Karnataka 
and Tamil Nadu, and others elsewhere have played a major role in this initiative. In other 
cases, however, the banks or other lenders have made contact with existing groups, usually of 
women, and have extended substantial loans to them after only a rather brief appraisal, which 
focuses not on the economic activities undertaken by the members but on the ‘track record’ of 
the group in its micro-banking’ activities with its own members’ funds, and its apparent 
cohesion. 
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The lender may take a lien on a proportion of the groups’ own savings, which have to be held 
on deposit in the lending banks and may be drawn on in case of arrears. Although such 
operations are relatively recent, so that it is too early to draw final conclusions, it does seem to 
be possible to achieve close to 100% on-time repayment from the groups, with low transaction 
costs for the lender, and no other intermediary NGO or other expenses. 
The Kenya Rural Enterprises Programme has some three years of comparative experience with 
this form of lending and with the more structured and far more expensive Bangladesh 
approach; to date, they have concluded that it is far more profitable to lend to groups for on- 
lending, rather than to use them only as first line collectors and appraisers, and they are 
vigourously expanding this form of lending as a basis for long term unsubsidised operations. 
It is not yet possible to produce a segregated set of accounts to show the financial impact on 
the lender of this fourth type of micro-credit in the same way as for the first three examples, 
since one of the main merits of this approach is that it can easily be fitted into normal branch 
banking operations This means that it is not as easy to separate out the revenues and costs as 
when a separate specialised operation has to be set up. 
KREP, although they are not a bank, and they cannot take deposits and do not have to cover 
the costs of their funds, have careMy monitored the results of lending to pre-existing groups, 
under what they call their ‘Chikola’ programme. They had by mid-1994 disbursed funds to 
some 180 groups, over a period of three years. Not one payment from the groups to KREP 
has ever been even one day late, and the income from interest charges on these loans has been 
almost three times the management costs. The surplus would approximately cover the cost of 
funds if KREP had to borrow from commercial sources. It is clear that the transaction costs 
are far lower than for individual loans, because only one bulk loan is made and the costs of on- 
lending are borne entirely by the group. 
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When commercial banks make this type of loans to groups they do not have to charge higher 
rates of interest than for their traditional loans, because the bulk loan to the group is for a 
reasonably large amount; the final borrowers pay far higher rates for their loans from what is in 
effect their own bank. The bulk lender has no control over the on-lending rate, and many such 
groups charge themselves as much as five percent or more per month. They know very well 
that the returns on the capital invested in their micro-enterprises allows them to pay these 
rates, and the interest payments can be credited to their fund, to allow them to make more and 
bigger loans in the future, and to provide backing for increased bank loans if they need them. 
Common Features 
These four systems, and the many others like them, have achieved remarkably high rates of 
recovery, which contrast very favourably with traditional government or donor sponsored 
poverty oriented loan schemes. The proportions of non-performing loans are also far lower 
than those experienced by many international commercial banks in the sovereign or property 
based lending portfolios; on time repayments of less than 95% are unusual, and some 
programmes have attained 100% repayment over one or two years. 
The systems are very different from one another, but they share certain features. They all 
involve higher than so-called ‘commercial’ or ‘market’ rates of interest; the comparison is 
however unreal, because their clients do not have access to loans at ‘market rates’, as these are 
normally understood. For them the alternative market for credit is the moneylender, and these 
rates are far lower than they are used to paying from such traditional informal sources. 
Most of these programmes also serve far more women than men. This is not usually because 
they set out to reach women in particular, but because women repaid better, and women 
generally respond more favourably to the group or community based methods which are often 
employed. Women are often treated as a weaker group who need assistance more than men; 
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this is certainly true in the case of access to traditional institutional credit, but in the area of 
micro-credit, their performance has shown them to be stronger. A programme with a majority 
of women clients, or one with only women, is more likely to achieve self-sustainability more 
quickly than one with a majority of men. 
Most micro-credit systems achieve sustainability not only by charging apparently high interest 
rates, but also by shifting part of the transaction costs onto the borrowers, through groups or 
other means. This reduces the lender’s costs, and it also improves the quality of loan appraisal, 
supervision and collection, since the borrowers’ own neighbours are generally far better at the 
details of loan management in he field than are even the best trained bankers. 
This delegation can of course be dangerous, unless the group to whom the fimctions are 
delegated has the capacity to undertake them. As micro-business people and members of their 
communities, the members are likely to have the necessary knowledge and skills, but 
community groups can easily be ‘hijacked’ by local vested interests. 
Well designed micro-credit systems automatically discourage better-off people who might 
want to exploit them, since the loans are small, the interest costs are high and regular weekly 
meetings, with fixed savings requirements, are tiresome. One of the strongest arguments for 
self-sustainability, in fact, is that credit, like any other product or service, is only likely to be 
exploited if it is subsidised. 
The Constraints to further Adoption 
These are only four examples of large scale cost-covering micro-credit, and there are several 
others, but they are still only isolated islands in a general sea of unrelieved poverty. 
Institutional micro-credit, in one form or another, may not be as profitable for its suppliers as 
cola drinks, but it does appear to have the potential to benefit poor people, with little or no 
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subsidy, and to help millions of needy families to avoid some of the harshest effects of 
economic change. Large numbers of voluntary organisations are learning from what has been 
achieved and starting their own programmes, but their outreach is limited and their strength 
lies in their ability to do things which can never be profitable. 
The commercial banks, on the other hand, are in the business of financial services, they have 
large and often under-used branch networks, in rural and urban areas, they are often already 
generating substantial deposits from the savings of owners of micro-enterprises, they need new 
profitable business and they need to demonstrate their commitment to equitable development; 
why have they not enthusiastically grasped this new market, for their own and their clients’ 
benefit, and how can their reluctance be overcome? 
The railways allowed the airlines to take away their long-haul passenger business rather than 
starting their own airlines, and IBM was too late to appreciate the significance of the personal 
computer; market leaders rarely perceive the future realities of their businesses, and 
commercial banks may be no different. There are also some particular features of many 
successful micro-credit programmes which may help to explain why they have not been more 
widely adopted by bankers. 
They are essentially ‘bottom-up’ as opposed to ‘top-down’ initiatives, usually with a firm base in 
traditional informal savings and credit systems. The clients have a strong sense of partnership 
with the institution, they are from the poorer sectors of the population, by design, and they are 
mainly women. The transaction costs are also inevitably high, so that the viability of the 
programmes depends on interest or other charges which are far higher than normal. 
It is hardly surprising that most bankers regard services to the poor as a public relations or 
social responsibility exercise, which must of necessity be subsidised by mainline business, and 
must therefore be limited in scope. High charges are clearly inconsistent with this view, and 
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few bankers are willing to introduce a form of business which deliberately excludes any but the 
poorest customers, and then requires that they should be charged an apparently extortionate 
price. It would seem bound to be at the same time a repayment and a public relations disaster. 
Banks also have few links with traditional systems, and are perceived by most poor people as 
alien institutions, whose services are mainly for the rich. Their main role in colonial times was 
to take savings from the rural poor and to lend them to the urban rich; some poor people have 
savings accounts with banks, but current accounts, overdrafts and loans are as unfamiliar to 
them as the idea of lending them money is to the bankers. 
The Way Ahead 
There appear to be a number of different approaches, whereby very small amounts of loan 
funding can be channelled to poor people, and recovered from them, in a way which allows 
them substantially to improve their own livelihoods and which also allows the financial 
institution to cover the costs, including the cost of funds, and even to make a modest profit to 
develop a substantial equity base for future unsubsidised expansion. 
The case studies have not addressed the issue of start up costs, and most programmes are not 
making a proportionate contribution to head ofice costs, but they do appear likely to be able 
to do so in the near future. Although none of the micro-credit programmes appears likely to be 
able to pay a dividend on the initial capital invested in it, it does seem to be possible for such 
programmes to achieve sustainability, and growth, provided they are capitalised at a sufficient 
level to enable them to access other funds, and to offer reasonable security for their clients’ 
savings. 
Like soft drinks or cigarettes, financial services can apparently be distributed through 
numerous alternative channels, and each producer has to select the most appropriate 
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‘marketing mix’ in relation to the particular consumers he wishes to reach. Credit is presumably 
at least as desirable a product as most fast moving consumer goods, and commercial bankers 
should surely view micro-credit not as an matter of charity, or of officially prescribed lending 
targets, but as a vast and largely untapped market opportunity. 
If this change of attitude can be achieved, the banks themselves will be able profitably to 
expand their deposit base and their advances, and the vast mass of the presently ‘unbanked’ will 
be able to benefit not only from the substantial material return on their investment, but also 
from the genuine sense of empowerment which can come from access to capital not as charity 
but on a commercial basis. There are few mass-market opportunities where every party can 
gain so much. 
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